We introduce a protocol for quantum secret sharing based on reusable entangled states. The entangled state between the sender and the receiver acts only as a carrier and no measurement is performed on this shared state. Half of the sequence of bits can be retrieved independently and for the other half the receivers need each other's assistance. We also show that the protocol is completely safe against eavesdropping.
Introduction
Quantum Cryptography is a branch of science in which the counter-intuitive and non-classical features of quantum mechanics like uncertainty, entanglement and nonlocality, are turned into absolutely useful devices for secure distribution of information. The past few years has witnessed progress not only in the theoretical side of this subject but also remarkable achievements in the experimental realization of cryptography over reasonably long distances [1, 2, 3] . (For a review containing many theoretical and practical issues, see [4] .) One of the desirable protocols for secure communication is called secret sharing, a procedure for splitting and distributing a message to several parties so that the message can be recovered only by collaboration of certain authorized subsets of receivers and contain no information for any smaller subsets of authorized receivers or for other unauthorized subsets. The simplest example is when the sender Alice wants to send a secret message to two receivers Bob and Charlie. For security reasons it is desirable for Alice that non of the receivers can recover the message on his own. (For examples of realistic situations when such a need arises see the introductions of [5] , and [6] ). In a simple classical solution for this problem, Alice produces a random string of bits, of the same size as the message which is also a string of bits. She then adds (mod 2) the two strings bit-wise to produce a third string. The random string and the third one contain no information by themselves. These are sent separately to Bob and Charlie, who can only add them again to reproduce the message. In this part of secret sharing the information has been split into two parts, non of which contain any useful information for the party who receives it. The information is retrieved only when the two pieces are put together. Of course this part should be supplemented by classical cryptography to make the protocol safe against Eavesdropping by an unauthorized third party, Eve who may find access to both pieces. Motivated by the new perspectives and dramatic success of quantum cryptography, Hillery, Buzek, and Berthiaume proposed a quantum solution for secret sharing in which the two parts, namely splitting of information and protection of information is combined in one protocol [5] . In their method which is inspired by the quantum key distribution method of Bennett and Brasard [7] , and Ekert [8] , Alice, Bob and Charlie share a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state [9] . They then carry out measurements of their bits in either of the two non-commuting bases, say x and y bases. Only after they communicate the bases they have chosen for their measurement, they can establish a shared secret key between themselves. Like the protocol of Bennett and Brasard proposed in 1984, known as the BB84 protocol, the key is established a posteriori, since they should discard those cases in which the bases for their measurement do not agree and the result of their measurements are not correlated. This shared secret key can then be used by Alice for communicating messages to Bob and Charlie. The authors of [5] then go on to discuss the security of their protocol against eavesdropping and cheating by one of the receivers and show that their method is safe in that any kind of cheating or eavesdropping introduces error rates which can be easily detected by the other parties. They also propose a method similar to teleportation so that Alice can send an ar-bitrary quantum state to the two receivers so that again only by their collaboration they can recover the state at the destination. Of course the state is retrieved by only one of them so the no-cloning theorem [10] is not violated. We should also mention another scheme for quantum key distribution and secret sharing proposed by Cabello [11, 12] which is not based on measurements in orthogonal bases but on the so called entanglement swapping. In this method Alice, Bob and Charlie each holds a Bell state and all three also share a GHZ state. At each round of Bell measurements performed by all three parties and the resulting entanglement swapping a new random Bell state is produced by Alice. The type of this Bell state which can be characterized by two classical bits is the key. One of these bits can be determined by Bob and Charlie independently and for the other bit they need each other's assistance. For a detailed description of this protocol see [11, 12] and [13] .
The aim of the present article which is inspired by [14, 15] in quantum key distribution, is to present an alternative method for secret sharing, which is based on sharing entangled states in a completely different way. There are several points that should be mentioned comparing our method with that of Hillery, Buzek and Berthiaume [5] and Cabello [11, 12] . 1 -The method of [5] like that of [7] is essentially based on one pillar of quantum mechanics, that is the uncertainty principle, according to which measurements of a single state in non-commuting bases lead to un-correlated results. In our method information is concealed from Eavesdroppers by entangling the states carrying this information to pre-existing states in the hands of authorized parties. This is also the case with the protocol of [11, 12] . The GHZ state in our protocol is used only as a carrier to which data qubits are entangled and carried to the destination. Therefore Eavesdropper who intercept the data bits find no information at all, since the density matrix of these bits is completely mixed. 2 -In our method the key can be established a priori. There is no need for discarding some of the bits. Thus the method has a higher rate of information transfer and moreover can be used for sending pre-determined messages to Bob and Charlie by Alice. 3 -In our method one single GHZ state, can be used throughout the process, while in [5] the GHZ state collapses (because of measurements) at the end of every round of sending a bit. If experimental realization of constructing and distributing GHZ states to parties at long separation becomes a possibility it is plausible that the maintenance of the correlations of these states will be easier than their creation anew for every round. And finally 4 -Our protocol has a flavor of circuit design so that it is almost obvious how to generalize it to more than two receiving parties (by adding more lines) or to states with more than two level states or qudits (by substituting the gates with appropriate ones.)
However there is a price that we pay for the above advantages, in that compared with [5] , in our method Alice has to entangle two extra bits to the GHZ state by local operations which are disentangled by Bob and Charlie at the destination. Therefore the use of one single GHZ state as the carrier is balanced by the entangling and disentangling two extra particles with the GHZ state at the departure and destination for sending every bit. The structure of this paper is as follows: In section 2 we introduce the protocol for two receiving parties. In section 3 we discuss the generalizations to n receiving parties and to d− level states . We end up with conclusion in section 4. In the appendix we collect the proof of some of the formulas used in the text.
The secret sharing protocol with two parties
Suppose Alice wants to sent a message which is already in the form of a sequence of classical bits q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , · · ·, (q i = 0 or 1) to Bob and Charlie, so that the receivers can infer this message only by their mutual assistance. In this section we describe our new quantum solution for this problem. We describe our protocol in a gradual manner, that is we start with the very basic idea and then add the necessary details as we go along. Our presentation is dependent very much on a concise notation, which we collect here for convenience and future reference. We invite the reader to pay due attention to this notation, otherwise he or she may run into ambiguities.
Notations
We use subscripts a, b, c and e on states and operators for Alice, Bob, Charlie, and Eve respectively. Any other space carrying message qubits is specified by numerical subscripts, 1, 2, etc. A ket state | , say a three particle one, may be denoted by | a,b,c where we want to show that the qubits are with Alice, Bob and Charlie respectively or simply as | 3 with a boldface 3 when we want to stress only the number of qubits. When the number of particles or the possessors of qubits are clear from the context, we do not write this subscript. A controlled gate like CNOT is denoted simply by C, and is specified by two subscripts, the first one is the control bit, the second is the target bit. Thus C a1 is the controlled NOT gate which is controlled by Alice qubit and acts on the qubit in line 1:
( 1) where q and q ′ are 0 and 1 and addition is performed mod two. The Hadamard gate acts as:
We denote states like |00...0 and |11...1 by |0 n and |1 n respectively, where n is the number of bits involved. A state like |q + q ′ means |q
Consider two states |q 1,2,···k and |q ′ 1 ′ ,2 ′ ,···k ′ and an operator defined by
then the following property is true:
Similar to what we have for one qubits. By |0 n and |1 n , we mean states which are uniform superposition of basis states the sum of whose digits modulo 2 are respectively 0 and 1, i.e:
similarly
Note that
In general
Note also that the states |0 and |1 are respectively even and odd parity states, the parity of which can be determined only by the collaboration of all parties possessing the bits. Now consider two states |q 1,2,···k and |q ′ 1 ′ ,2 ′ ,···k ′ and the same operator C defined above, then again this operator acts as a CNOT gate for this parity states:
The proof of this property and its generalization to d level states, is given in the appendix.
We also define generalized GHZ states |G n as:
Note that for general n the |G n states are really not generalized GHZ states, and can not be used for tests of non-locality. For a definition and criteria in defining them see [16] . The states with definite parity are constructed by the action of Hadamard gates on GHZ states:
In particular we we will use the following property:
Having defined our notations and conventions, we describe in the next section the protocol for only two receiving parties. The generalization to n receiving parties is then clear from the above notations.
Splitting of information
For sending a bit q, Alice can encode this bit in either of the following ways. 1 -She encodes q as a state |q 2 ≡ |q, q 1,2 and sends the qubits to Bob and Charlie. At the destination Bob and Charlie can simply measure their corresponding bits and recover the bit q, without each other's assistance. Or else 2 -She can encode the bit as
(|0, q +|1, q +1 ) 1,2 and send them to Bob and Charlie. Any such state gives no information at all to either Bob or Charlie, since the density matrix of each of them is easily seen to be completely mixed. However they can identify the bit q by communicating to each other the result of their measurements. The value of the bit q is simply obtained by adding their result mod 2. In fact Alice encodes half of the bits say the odd numbered ones q 1 , q 3 , q 5 · · · in the first way and the other half, the even numbered ones q 2 , q 4 , q 6 · · ·, in the second way. The necessity of this switching comes from protection against Eavesdropping which will be discussed at length in the sequel. In this way Alice can split a message so that Bob and Charlie can recover the message only by their cooperation. A cheating of the kind of wrong declaration of the results by one of the receivers leads to an error rate of 50 percent which is easily detected by comparing a subsequence of the bits received with those actually sent by Alice. By this comparison Alice finds that at least one of the receivers has been dishonest. Although she can not determine which one. This is the part of protocol which deals with splitting of information. Now we are faced with the problem of protecting information against Eavesdropping.
Protection of information
We should assume that the quantum channel used by Alice for sending the qubits is not secure and can be penetrated by an unauthorized third party called Eve. The strategy for protecting information is to entangle the message qubits with an already entangled state in possession of Alice, Bob and Charlie, which we call the carrier state, in a highly mixed form, so that while being sent, these qubits if accessed by Eve, carry no information at all. We use two different forms of entanglement for odd and even bits. For the odd numbered bits, she entangles the state |q 12 with the carrier state |G a,b,c and for the even numbered bits she entangles the state |q 12 with the carrier state |0 . It is important to note that the two types of carriers are alternatively transformed to each other by local operations of Alice, Bob and Charlie. We need this two forms of carriers in order to protect against the most general attack of Eve, as will be explained later on. Consider an odd round. Alice entangles the state |qq 12 to the already present GHZ state |G abc by performing CNOT gates C a1 C a2 on |G abc |qq 12 to produce the state:
See figure (1) . At the destination, Bob and Charlie act on this state by the operators C b1 and C c2 and extract the state |q, q 2 where each one of them can read independently his own bit. By her action Alice has entangled the double bit |q 2 so that while in transmission it is a mixture of |q 2 and |(1 + q) 2 . Therefore the density matrix of the double bits in transmission is
which conveys no information to Eve about the value of the bit being sent.
For the even bits which are encoded as states |q 2 , Alice entangles this state to an even parity state |0 a,b,c by performing only one single CNOT gate C a1 on |0 abc ⊗|q 12 to produce the state
where we have used the property (9) . Again at the destination, Bob and Charlie act on this state by the operators C b1 and C c2 where now by (12) they extract |q 1,2 which they can identify completely only by their collaboration. It is important to note that without each others assistance, they are not able to find any useful information about the bit sent by Alice. In fact it is easy to calculate the density matrix of the combined state of each of them and the qubit in his possession. A simple calculation shows that:
with a similar result for Bob. Moreover to protect against Eve,s attack, Alice has concealed the encoded double qubit |q in an equal mixture of |0 and |1 so that even by finding access to both of the bits in transmission, she can not find the value of the bit being sent. Note that it is not even possible for either of the receivers say Charlie to collaborate with Eve who supposedly is intercepting both the qubits in transmissions to find the key. This is equivalent to the supposition that Charlie has full access to both of the bits in transmission. We now calculate the density matrix ρ c,1,2 to prove that even in this case Charlie can not find the key without Bob's assistance. From (18) we find:
From which we find:
which proves our assertion. It remains to see how Alice, Bob and Charlie switch their entangled state from the GHZ state |G a,b,c for odd bits to the even state |0 a,b,c state for even bits. They can do this simply by performing Hadamard gates on their respective states at the end of every round of the protocol. The reason is relation (15) . Thus they start the first round with the GHZ state |G 3 and end up with the |0 3 state which is used for the second round. At the end of the second round they have produced again the GHZ state |G 3 which will be used for the next round and so on. All this is shown in figure  (1 and 2) .
Detection of Eve
Although the data bits being sent are concealed in highly mixed states and as shown above Eve who can be either of Bob or Charlie or a third party different from them, can not obtain any information from intercepting these states, we should show that her presence can be detected by the legitimate parties. In case she intercepts the
The encoding for even rounds.
bits, measure them and send copies to Bob and Charlie, due to the randomness of her measurement, she will introduce 50 percent error in the data received by Bob and Charlie who can detect her presence by comparing a substring of their received data with the one sent by Alice. However suppose that Eve follows a more complicated strategy in that she entangles her system (ancilla) with the states of Alice, Bob and Charlie in a form:
where η i,j,k 's are un-normalized states of Eve, so that at the end of each round of sending and receiving a bit, useful information about that bit is collected in his ancilla which she can measure safely later on. Consider an odd round of the process and suppose that the starting state of Alice, Bob and Charlie, ignorant of the presence of Eve is as above. Eve is clever enough to entangle her state such that she does not perturb the values of the final bits measured by Bob and Alice when the protocol is run for this round. She then finds that the ideal form of entanglement is as follows:
where we have suppressed the subscripts on the states and the ⊗ symbol. If she adds any other state to (23) , she inevitably will arouse the suspicion of Bob and Charlie. For example a state like |001 when coupled to a double bit |qq and acted upon by C a1 C b1 C c2 as required by the protocol, will contribute a term |q, 1 + q to the final state measured by Bob and Charlie. Thus the desirable form of entanglement for the odd round is given by (23) . A similar analysis reveals to Eve that the ideal form of entanglement for an even round of the protocol is:
The crucial point is that the Hadamard gates at the end of each round do not allow Eve to have desirable entanglement for every round. Eve can have desirable entanglement only if H ⊗3 |Θ + = |Θ − and vise versa. However we have:
from which we find:
This is equal to |Θ + only if ξ 000 = ξ 111 and η 000 = η 110 = η 101 = η 011 . This means that this switching between desirable entanglement at alternative rounds is possible for Eve only if there is no entanglement at all!
Generalizations
One of the advantages of a protocol which is formulated in the language of circuits is that it is readily generalized to n receiver parties,(by adding more lines to the circuit) and to d−level states (by replacing the gates with their d− level analogs). With the notation introduced in section 2, it is quite straightforward to generalize this protocol, as outlined below.
n receiving parties
The sender is still called Alice and the receivers are now denoted by B 1 , B 2 · · · B n . At the beginning they share a generalized GHZ state which |G n+1 : As before Alice encodes an odd bit q as |q n , entangles it with |G ab 1 ···bn by acting with the operators C a1 C a2 · · · C an , to produce the state
and sends the state to the receivers who disentangle the state |q 12···n and read the bit q independently. As before all the parties including Alice, act on their state with Hadamard gates and turn it into an Even state |0 ready for the next round. In an even round Alice encodes a bit q into the state |q , entangles this state with |0 ab 1 ···bn by the operation C a1 to produce the state:
At the destination the receivers can disentangle the state |q 12···n by their CNOT operations
Note that the identity of a state with a given parity, is determined only after all the receivers communicate with each other their results.
No subset consisting of k < n parties can determine the parity of a state by their measurements.
All our discussions and proofs of security for two receiving parties carry over to this case in a straightforward way. 
Secret sharing using d-level states
In view of the recent interest in formulating quantum protocols and algorithms for arbitrary dimensional Hilbert spaces [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 15, 13] we give here the ddimensional version of our protocol. We only consider the case of 2 receiving parties. The case of n receiving parties follows easily. All the steps of the protocol are exactly the same as for the 2-level case, except that the appropriate gates for d level states should be used instead of 2 level gates. Let us first collect some useful results about d level states and gates. The Hadamard gate has been generalized in [17, 18, 20, 15, 13] as:
where ζ = e 
In contrast to the NOT gate, the R gate is not its own inverse. Its inverse is denoted by L.
It is ready checked that these operators satisfy and identity similar to the 2 level case:
When we substitute the CNOT gates with R c gates, the same circuit that produced the 2-level GHZ state will now produce the d-level GHZ state |G 3 , figure (3):
Instead of even and odd parity states we have states the sum of whose digits add up to a number q = 0, 1, · · · d − 1:
These states are constructed from basis states by the gate operation: |q = L 21 H 2 |q, 0 .
Finally we obtain the states
To see this note that
where we have used the identity d−1 j=0 ζ jn = dδ n,0 . As an example for d = 3 we have:
We are now in a position to substitute the the 2− level gates of the circuits of figures (1) and (2) with their d− level counterparts and run the protocol with d− level states. The only gates which may cause ambiguity are the controlled NOT gates, since a NOT gate may be replaced either by an R gate or an L gate. We provide the answer and leave the verification to the reader. In the odd rounds Alice uses R c gates for entanglement and Bob and Charlie use L c gates for disentanglement. In the even rounds all three parties use L c gates. It is instructive to determine the density matrix of the qubits sent to Bob and Charlie in the odd and even rounds. The state |Φ + in the odd round is:
Thus a state |q, q is concealed in a state which is a uniform superposition of all the states of the form |k, k and sent to Bob and Charlie.
For the even rounds we have:
from which we obtain
Again an encoded |q is concealed in a state which is a uniform superposition of all the states of the form |i and sent to Bob and Charlie.
Discussion
We have presented a new protocol for quantum secret sharing. In our protocol a sequence of bits is transmitted to two parties so that they can recover half of the bits independently and for the rest half they need to collaborate to find the identity of the bits. We have provided arguments and proofs for the security of this protocol against rather general attack. It will be interesting to develop rigorous proofs for the absolute security of this kind of protocol both for key distribution [14] , [15] and for secret sharing, as has been given for the BB84 protocol and its variations [22, 23, 24] . A good feature of this protocol is that it uses entangled states as secures carriers of information. Another good feature of this protocol is that at least in principle it is easily implemented as a quantum circuit. This allows generalizations to be conceived more easily than those which are based on measurements of incompatible observables. One of these generalizations has been presented in this article, namely to d− level states. A generalization which may be of much interest is to consider the cases of more general access structures [17, 6] . For example suppose that we want to send a message to three receivers Bob, Charlie and David, so that Bob and Charlie or Bob and David can recover the message but Charlie and David can not. It can be easily checked by looking at the possible outcomes of measurements that if we can encode a bit q as |q bc ⊗ |q bd , we achieve the above aim. Or if we want the access structure to be such that any two of these three persons be able to read the message, then it is enough to encode the bit as |q bc |q bd |q cd . However the problem is to implement these kinds of encoding so that we also protect the messages from Eavesdroppers. There is also the problem of scaling the number of extra bits used with the number of receivers which must be taken into account. These problems are currently under investigation.
